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1  Background
One of the most important objectives of economic policy is to ensure, via the appro-
priate manipulation of the available policy instruments (control variables), that the 
economic system tracks, as closely as possible, a desired path for the policy targets (out-
puts). One of the approaches that has been utilized for the design of economic policy is 
the feedback approach, stemming from the mathematical control theory literature. Vari-
ous aspects of the feedback methodology have been utilized for the purposes of policy 
design for more than 50 years, starting with the use of PID controllers in the seminal 
paper by Phillips (1954). These aspects range from (stochastic) optimal feedback con-
trol (see, among others, Amman and Kendrick 2003; Christodoulakis and Levine 1987; 
Christodoulakis and Van Der Ploeg 1987; Leventides and Kollias 2014) to nonlinear 
(Athanasiou et al. 2008; Athanasiou and Kotsios 2008; Kotsios and Leventidis 2004) and 
stochastic control applications (Dassios et al. 2014).
The importance of feedback rules for policy design is evident from the fact that for 
more than 20  years monetary policy decisions have been, to a large extent, based on 
the Taylor rule (see Taylor 1993); this is a linear feedback policy rule stipulating (in its 
simplest form) that the interest rate is set based on deviations of inflation and GDP from 
target levels of inflation and potential GDP, respectively. It is interesting to note here that 
Taylor presented a rule that had fixed settings for the parameters; in particular:
(1)r = p+ 0.5y+ 0.5(p− 2)+ 2
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where r is the federal funds rate, p the rate of inflation and y the percentage deviation of 
real GDP from a target (e.g., potential output). The rule stipulates that, for example, if 
GDP exceeds its full-employment level, then nominal interest rates need to be increased.
One of the advantages of adopting the feedback framework is that it allows to explic-
itly take into account the time lags associated with the conduct of economic policy, since 
they can be incorporated into the dynamics of the model and the feedback policy rule 
(Kendrick 1988). Most importantly, the feedback methodology allows for more frequent 
(and, possibly, smaller) interventions by the policymaker, which are likely to result in a 
smoother transition path for the economy (see Kendrick and Amman 2014; Kendrick 
and Shoukry 2014).
Our aim in this paper is to utilize the algorithmic feedback control framework for the 
design of short-term fiscal policy interventions. That is, we want to design linear feed-
back policy rules for the fiscal policy instruments available so that predetermined (fixed) 
desired sequences for the policy targets (GDP and public debt levels) are simultaneously 
tracked. In particular, we assume that the policymaker has at his disposal two instru-
ments: expenditures related to compensation of public sector employees, social benefits, 
etc. (i.e., expenditures that cover individual and collective consumption) and expendi-
tures related to investment projects (e.g., infrastructure) that will be funded by the gov-
ernment (either via its own budget or by using external funding such as EU structural 
funds or the funds available from the so-called Juncker Investment Plan). These invest-
ment expenditures are subject to several time lags (including, among others, legislative, 
design and implementation lags), and as a result, they will affect the economy with a 
possibly substantial delay; however, the feedback mechanism used allows us to explicitly 
incorporate these lags into the design of the fiscal policy rules. These rules will provide 
the exact sequence of the policy instruments necessary to ensure that the target levels of 
GDP and public debt will be simultaneously met, without any deviation (thus, the track-
ing error will be equal to zero).
In order to design the policy rules, we use an algorithmic linear feedback control 
technique known as (exact) model matching control. It is a completely parameterized 
technique allowing us to develop appropriate symbolic algorithms in order to design the 
requested policy rules. One of the main advantages of this approach is that we obtain 
as a solution a class of feedback policy rules; this grants the policymaker the ability to 
choose the most appropriate policy rule from the set of potential policies available, 
depending on the particular case at hand. Moreover, the policy rules take into account 
the state of the economy, since they incorporate the relevant information available up to 
the decision period, and they are responsive (i.e., the coefficients of the algebraic expres-
sions are not fixed), thus representing a more discretionary approach to the design of 
fiscal policy.
Our analysis is conducted in the context of a linear, deterministic variant of the stand-
ard multiplier–accelerator model proposed by Samuelson (1939). The main reason for 
choosing this simple linear model is its tractability, as it will allow us to thoroughly 
examine the effects of the proposed methodology on the workings of the system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 presents the model, in Sect. 3 we 
develop the proposed methodology, and Sect. 4 contains some simulations and the main 
results of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
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2  Formulation of the model
As already stated in the introduction, the model we chose is a linear, deterministic vari-
ant of the multiplier–accelerator model coupled with the government budget constraint. 
This model has been extensively used in the relevant literature, due to its tractability and 
because it can easily be extended to both nonlinear and stochastic variants (see, among 
others, Dassios and Zimbidis 2014; Dassios and Devine 2016; Dalla and Varelas 2016; 
Dalla et al. 2016; Hommes 1995; Puu 2007).
The multiplier–accelerator part of the model consists of an income identity and four 
behavioral equations. Assuming a closed economy, the income identity is given by:
where t ∊ N is the time index and the real sequences C(t), I(t), Gw(t) and GI(t) denote 
consumption, private investment, general government expenditures (compensation 
of employees, social benefits, etc.) and government investment, respectively. For the λi 
parameters, we assume that λi ∊ (0, 1) and λ0 + λ1 + λ2 = 1. As already stated, govern-
ment investment-related expenditures are subject to various time lags, such as legislative 
(e.g., the time until the projects to be funded by the government are approved by the 
relevant parliamentary committee) and implementation lags (the time until the funds 
are actually disbursed) and, as a result, the policy will hit the economy with a (possibly 
substantial) delay and its effects will become apparent in subsequent periods.
These lags are captured by the λi parameters, which indicate the percentage of the gov-
ernment’s decision to invest in period t that is realized in period t +  i; that is, the λi 
parameters represent the percentage of the funds that the government aims to invest in 
period t that are actually disbursed in period t + i.
Moving on to the behavioral equations, the consumption function following Puu 
(2007) is given by:
where s ∊ (0, 1) is the marginal propensity to save and
is the disposable income. For the tax function, we assume that it takes the following tax-
on-income form:
where τ ∈ (0, 1) is the constant tax rate.
Investment depends on the accelerator principle:
where v > 1 denotes the accelerator.
Finally, the government budget constraint has the standard form:
(2)
Y (t) = C(t)+ I(t)+ 0G
I (t)+ 1G
I (t − 1)
+ 2G
I (t − 2)+ Gw(t)
(3)C(t) = (1− s)Y d(t − 1)+ sY d(t − 2)
(4)Y d(t) = Y (t)− T (t)
(5)T (t) = τY (t)
(6)I(t) = v(Y (t − 1)− Y (t − 2))
(7)B(t)− (1+ r)B(t − 1) = GI (t)+ Gw(t)− T (t)
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where B(t) denotes debt outstanding and r is the (constant) interest on public debt.
After all the necessary substitutions among Eqs. (2)–(7) and some necessary algebra, 
we end up with the following pair of equations:
where a1 = (1− s)(1− τ)+ v, a2 = s(1− τ)− v. This is the input–output form of the 
model, with Y(t), B(t) being the outputs (policy targets) and GI, Gw being the inputs (pol-
icy instruments).
3  Solution technique
Our aim is to design linear feedback policy rules for short-term fiscal policy interven-
tions (that is, for the next 4–6 quarters). In particular, we want to design policy rules for 
general government expenditure (Gw(t)) and government investment (GI(t)) which, once 
implemented, will modify the dynamics of the system in such a way that predetermined, 
desired sequences for the levels of GDP and public debt will be simultaneously, exactly 
tracked.
The feedback rules relate the current value of the policy instruments to lagged values 
of both the instruments and the targets; thus, the requested linear feedback policy rules 
will be functions of the form:
where ai, cj , . . . , ns are unknown, real parameters to be determined. The solution method 
provides us with a class of policy rules (that is, different specifications for the algebraic 
expressions) which ensures that the policy rules are responsive (see Taylor 1993). This 
is in contrast to rules that specify fixed settings for the instruments (e.g., the k% rule 
for money supply growth proposed by Friedman), and thus, these rules represent a 
more discretionary approach to the design and exercise of fiscal policy. Moreover, the 
dependence of the current values of the instruments on lagged values of both the instru-
ments and the targets is a fundamental property of feedback rules known as causality 
(see Astrom and Wittenmark 1996), essentially ensuring that the policy rules take into 
account all the relevant information available regarding the state of the economy.
In order to design the feedback policy rules, we use a technique from the control 
theory literature known as (exact) model matching; it is a completely parameterized 
technique, allowing for proper symbolic algorithms to be developed. In what follows, 
we provide a brief description of the workings of the model matching approach (see 
(8)
Y (t)− a1Y (t − 1)− a2Y (t − 2)
= 0G
I(t) + 1G
I (t − 1)
+ 2G
I (t − 1+ Gw(t)B(t)
− (1+ r)B(t − 1)+ τY (t)





























mrY (t − r)+
∑
nsB(t − s)
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“Appendix 1” for the mathematical formulation and the paper by Kostarakos and Kotsios 
2017; Kotsios and Kostarakos 2016 for the relevant theorems and proofs): We want to 
design linear policy rules of form (9) which will modify the dynamics of original system 
(8)—the open-loop system—in such a way that predetermined, fixed targets for both out-
puts are simultaneously reached. We work as follows: First, the policymaker decides on 
the desired vector sequence for the policy targets, say
Then, using an appropriate symbolic algorithm we construct a linear (artificial) system, 
which has the property that its output is identical to the desired sequence �x∗(t); this is 
known as the desired system. Now, the problem at hand reduces to that of calculating 
the unknown parameters of policy rules (9) such that the original system becomes iden-
tical, i.e., it is matched to the desired one. Again, the parameters are calculated using an 
appropriate symbolic algorithm (see Kostarakos and Kotsios 2017; Kotsios and Kostara-
kos 2016; Kotsios and Leventidis 2004 for a detailed analysis of both algorithms).
The most important advantage of this approach is that the algorithms provide as a 
solution a class of feedback policy rules (that is, the coefficients of the algebraic expres-
sions of the resulting policy rules are not fixed), which essentially constitutes a set of 
potential policies. Thus, the policymaker is able to choose from this set those rules he 
deems more appropriate, depending on the problem at hand. This grants the policy-
maker the ability to take into account further considerations, such as the possible costs 
incurred from the implementation of the proposed policy plan and rule out politically 
infeasible rules. This class of policy rules can be augmented by calculating more complex 
rules (e.g., rules that contain more lags for the instruments and the targets). Another 
important advantage is that we can calculate the exact sequence of the policy instru-
ments necessary for tracking the desired target levels; that is, the sequence necessary for 
reaching the targets without any deviations. Moreover, the rules are such that the system 
immediately settles on the desired path: If the rule is applied in period t, then the system 
starts following the desired trajectory from t + 1. Therefore, these policy rules are “opti-
mal,” in the sense that they ensure zero settling time to the desired path. Finally, we can 
simulate the model under different policy rules in order to obtain a better insight as to 
how the policy rules affect the working of the system, under different specifications and 
policy scenarios.
4  An application
From an economic policy point of view, the timing of the policy action is a central 
issue. In particular, given the lags associated with policy conduct, should the govern-
ment immediately react to signs of a downturn in economic activity via, for example, a 
frontloaded disbursement of investment funds or would it be preferable to adopt a more 
gradual response? Moreover, how do the lags associated with policy conduct affect the 
actual implementation of the policy and its effects? In the analysis presented in Sect. 2, 







0G(t)+ 1G(t − 1)+ 2G(t − 2).
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Then, for the cases where λ2 > λ0, the government manages to immediately react to signs 
of a crisis (since a bigger percentage of the expenditures will be disbursed in period t), 
while for λ0 > λ2, the bulk of the investment expenditures will actually be disbursed in 
period t + 2; this implies that the changes in the size of government investment will have 
an effect in the economy with a two-period delay.
In order to examine the effects of different policy response times, we conducted a 
series of simulations. In particular, we examine the following cases for the λi, parameters:
1. The immediate response case: 0 = 0.2, 1 = 0.2, 2 = 0.6
2. The gradual response case: 0 = 0.4, 1 = 0.3, 2 = 0.3
3. The delayed response case: 0 = 0.5, 1 = 0.25, 2 = 0.25
We assume the following plausible values for the rest of the parameters of open-loop 
system (8):
Then, the open-loop system is:
Finally, the initial conditions are given in Table 1 and they depict an economy facing a 
severe downturn, with large decreases in GDP levels, accompanied with large increases 
in debt levels. Moreover, government investment-related expenditures GI have exhibited 
a large decline (possibly as a result of the policymaker’s efforts to reduce the budget).
We assume that the government aims for a 1% per period increase in GDP levels and 
a corresponding decrease in the levels of debt. Figures 1 and 2 present the time paths of 
the control variables under all policy scenarios (a table with the results can be found in 
“Appendix 2”).
The results of the numerical simulations are summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem  1 The numerical simulations indicate that the faster the response of the 
government in the face of a downturn, the smaller the necessary changes in the compo-
sition of government expenditure. On the contrary, if the response of the government is 
delayed, then large and abrupt changes are required rendering the policy plans politically 
infeasible.
v = 1, s = 0.2, τ = 0.4, r = 0.04
Y (t)− 1.54Y (t − 1)+ 0.94Y (t − 2) = 0G
I (t)
+ 1G
I (t − 1)+ 2G
I (t − 2)+ Gw(t)
B(t)− 1.04B(t − 1)+ 0.4Y (t) = GI (t)+ Gw(t)
Table 1 Initial conditions
Time Y B GI Gw
1 120 135 14.45 27
2 112 142 10.63 25
3 105 145 6.9 33.42
4 100 150 4.1 35.1
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As we can clearly see in the figures, the response time is critical regarding the compo-
sition of total government expenditures, i.e., the allocation between investment-related 
expenditures (GI(t)) and general government expenditures (Gw(t)) as well as regarding 
the necessary changes in the size of the policy instruments. In particular, when the gov-
ernment is able to immediately respond to a downturn (λ2 > λ0 case), then GI(t) needs to 
slightly increase in the first two periods of policy implementation, in order to provide a 
boost to the economy via the multiplier principle. At the same time, Gw(t) needs to be 
cumulatively decreased by 10%, to ensure that a surplus is generated so that a reduction 
in debt levels can be achieved. On the contrary, when the response time entails consid-
erable lags λ0 > λ2 case, the size of the changes of the policy instruments is significantly 
larger. Government investment funds need to be immediately increased due to the fact 
that this change will only hit the economy after two periods, and they exhibit a cumula-
tive increase of 48.8%. As a result of these increases, Gw(t) exhibits a sharp decline over 
the entire period (almost a 34% reduction), in order to achieve the debt reduction target. 
Such abrupt and large changes in the composition of total government expenditures are 
most likely politically infeasible. In the gradual response case, the necessary changes are 










Fig. 1 General government expenditure











Fig. 2 Government investment expenditure
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smaller and both instruments exhibit smooth transition paths. The results highlight the 
need for fast action by the policymaker, combined with frequent interventions (which is 
made possible when the feedback framework for policy design is adopted).
5  Conclusions
In this paper, we presented an application of algorithmic linear feedback control for the 
design of short-term fiscal policy. In particular, in the context of a linear deterministic 
variant of the multiplier–accelerator model, using an algebraic control theory technique 
known as exact model matching, we designed a class of linear feedback laws such that 
the system will immediately track a predetermined, desired trajectory for both policy 
targets, without any deviations. Moreover, in order to examine the effects of time lags, 
we run some simulations under different policy response rates. An important implica-
tion of the policy experiments is that immediate response allows the government to 
achieve the policy targets with relatively small policy interventions, compared to cases 
where there are larger delays in the disbursement of funds.
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Appendix 1: Mathematical formulation of the model matching problem
In this appendix, we provide the basic mathematical formulation of the model matching 
technique, elaborated in Sect. 3.
 First, we have to rewrite input–output model (8) in a more compact form. This is done 
via using the notion of the q-operator, a lag operator defined as qif(t) = f(t − i), for any 
sequence f(t) (see Astrom and Wittenmark 1996). Then, system (8) can be written in the 
so-called algebraic form:
where �x(t) = (Y (t),B(t))T , �u(t) = (GI (t),Gw(t))T and
This is also known as the open-loop system, i.e., the system before the policy interven-
tion. The desired system, that is the system having the property that its output is exactly 
equal to the desired sequence �x∗(t), is of the form:
where Ad ,Kd are 2 × 2 polynomial matrices constructed using an appropriate symbolic 
algorithm.
Then, we want to calculate feedback policy rules which, once applied to open-loop sys-
tem (8), will modify its dynamics in such a way that it will be identical, i.e., matched, to 
desired system (11). Feedback rules (9) can be written, using the q-operator, as:
A(q)�x(t) = K (q)�u(t)
(10)A =
[
1− a1q − a2q
2 0








(11)Ad(q)�x∗(t) = Kd(q)−→uc (t)
(12)R(q)�u(t) = T (q)−→uc (t)− S(q)�x(t)
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where R(q), S(q) and T(q) are unknown polynomial matrices in q to be designed.
It turns out that if the following set of equations holds:
then policy rules (12) can ensure that open-loop system (10) will be matched to the 
desired one.
These equations are solved using appropriate symbolic algorithms developed in Math-
ematica (see Kotsios and Kostarakos 2016).
Appendix 2: Table of results
 The following table presents the time paths of the policy instruments under all the time-
response cases (Table 2).
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